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Section 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Latin America’s recent commodity boom accentuated environmental degradation and social conflict across 
the Americas. The Latin American commodity boom was largely driven by new trade and investment 
with China, and concentrated in the petroleum, mineral extraction, and agricultural sectors — sectors 
endemic to environmental degradation and often the source of social conflict over rights and working 
conditions. Though with some notable exceptions, Latin American governments fell short of mitigating the 
social and environmental costs of trade and investment of the China-led commodity boom. While China 
should not be blamed for the bulk of Latin America’s environmental and social problems, as China ‘goes 
global’ it is important to mitigate the social and environmental impacts of its global activities in order to 
maintain good relations with host countries and to reduce the potential risks associated with overseas 
investment. Although some Chinese firms have demonstrated an ability to adhere to best practices in the 
social and environmental arena, by and large and Chinese firms operating in Latin America thus far lack 
the experience or policies in place to lessen the impacts of their investments in the region. As the Latin 
American economies slow down there is increasing pressure on governments to ‘streamline’ approvals 
for the relatively few opportunities for Chinese trade and investment, and to dampen the voice of civil 
society organizations working to hold governments and foreign firms accountable for their actions. It is in 
the interests of the Latin American and Chinese governments, as well as Chinese firms, to put in place the 
proper social and environmental policies in order to maximize the benefits and mitigate the risks of China’s 
economic activity in Latin America.
These are the findings of the Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas, a 
multi-university effort coordinated by the Center for Transformation Research (CENIT) in Argentina, 
the Research Center of the University of the Pacific (CIUP) in Peru, Boston University’s Global Economic 
Governance Initiative (GEGI), and Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute 
(GDAE). Comprised of eight country studies conducted by university-based researchers from across 
the hemisphere, the study asked two research questions. First, to what extent has China independently 
driven environmental and social change in Latin America? Secondly, to what extent do Chinese firms 
perform differently from their domestic and foreign counterparts when they invest in Latin America? 
From the country case studies and our own aggregate analysis we find that Chinese trade and investment 
in Latin America since the turn of the 21st century was a major driver of environmental degradation in 
the region, and was also a source of significant social conflict:
•	 	Latin	American	exports	to	China,	as	well	as	Chinese	investment	in	the	region,	have	been	much	more	
concentrated in primary commodities — especially extractive commodities — than Latin American 
economic relations with the rest of the world.
•	 	Primary-sector	exports	and	investment	—	especially	in	extractive	commodities	—	support	far fewer 
jobs than manufactured or agricultural exports. As a result, Latin America’s exports to China support 
about 20% fewer jobs per US$1 million than the region’s overall exports. As China continues to grow as 
a share of Latin American exports, this will necessarily drive down the employment benefits of exports 
overall.
•	 	Latin	American	exports	to	China	are	responsible	for	using	about	twice	as	much	water and emit 
upwards of 12 percent more net greenhouse gas emissions per dollar, compared to overall exports. 
Furthermore, the Chinese-financed infrastructure investments (like dams and railways to get the 
products to port) pose extremely serious threats for deforestation in some of South America’s most 
biodiverse areas.
That said, we find some cases of best practices in responding to these risks by Chinese investors, Latin 
American governments, and civil society that can be built upon:
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•	 	Latin American governments have set and enforced social and environmental standards, and 
elicited compliance from Chinese firms and firms exporting to China. For example, Ecuador’s labor 
law requires foreign oil companies to hire local workers and eliminates disparity between direct and 
subcontracted workers. Together, these laws address the most common sources of labor conflict for 
Chinese investors in our case studies. Peru has become a regional leader in transparency, joining the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (requiring detailed, online reporting of revenue flows 
between governments and extractive companies) and working with Chinese investors so that they, 
too, join this effort. 
•	 	China has developed important new guidelines for outbound investors, including environmental 
and social safeguards. However, these guidelines are still lacking relative to their counterparts in the 
world economy, especially in terms of transparency and enforcement.
•	 	We	find	some	cases	where	Chinese	companies	have	exceeded	local	standards	and	outperformed	
their peers, in case studies including Andes Petroleum in Ecuador, Chinalco in Peru, and Golden 
Dragon Afilliates in Mexico.
•	 	Latin	American	civil society has proven itself capable of holding governments and companies 
accountable. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have organized, demanded safeguards and 
oversight mechanisms, and mounted global campaigns against the most symbolic cases to create 
awareness and hold actors accountable.
•	 	NGOs,	academia,	and	other	civil	society	actors	have	begun	collaborating	with	governments	and	
Chinese firms to learn from experience and prevent (or mitigate) conflicts. 
Major challenges still exist, and are likely to become more acute as the initial surge of Chinese 
investment ebbs, commodity prices fall, and Latin American governments have less bargaining power 
over conditions for future investments. Specifically, we find:
•	 	Latin American governments face pressure to relax existing environmental and social protections, 
as mining and hydrocarbons ministries have become more powerful during this boom. In order to 
preserve the progress they have made, they will need to resist demands for deregulation.
•	 	China’s social and environmental safeguards for outbound investment are groundbreaking for a 
middle-income country, but they lack important enforcement power and transparency. They could be 
greatly enhanced through including formal reporting and grievance mechanisms, which would allow 
Latin American governments and civil society to assist in the difficult task of managing investment 
abroad.
•	 	Chinese investors show an ability to exceed local standards, but their performance varies widely 
across different regulatory regimes and between more experienced and newer firms. There is an 
important role for Latin American governments and civil society to raise the performance level 
across the board, through holding firms accountable and facilitating learning between firms.
•	 	Latin	American	civil society groups are responsible for many of the recent policy advances in the 
region. Like Latin American governments, they will need to hold the line against pressure to erode 
these protections. Furthermore, there is tremendous room for them to work constructively with the 
Chinese government to enhance oversight of investors. But to do so they will first need to establish 
constructive working relationships with Chinese and Latin American governments. For that, they 
need to develop stronger local and transnational networks, gain greater influence in national policy 
debates, and work constructively with governments where there are opportunities to do so.
China has pledged to invest upwards of $250 billion in Latin America over a decade. Governments, 
companies, and civil society will need to work hard to ensure that such investment brings profits 
while also raising living standards and protecting the environment. 
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Section 2: CHINA AS A DRIVER OF SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 
China has recently grown into a major export destination for the LAC region, second only to the United 
States. In 1993, China consumed less than 2% of LAC exports, but by 2013 it accounted for 9%. 
However, that importance was quite uneven across different export sectors. As Figure 1 shows, over 
the last decade China has tripled its market share of total LAC exports, more than tripled its share of 
extractive exports, and doubled its share of agricultural exports. But its demand for manufactured LAC 
exports has barely moved, staying at about 2% of LAC’s manufactured exports. 
 
FIGURE 1: China’s Share of LAC Exports, by Sector
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UN Comtrade data. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Agricultural and Extractive Exports as a share of LAC GDP, by Market
Source: Authors’ calculations based in UN Comtrade and IMF data.
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In fact, China has been an important driver in the expansion of LAC export of agriculture and 
extraction. As Figure 2 shows, while agricultural and extractive exports to China from LAC have been 
rising as a share of GDP, those exports to the rest of the world have been stagnant or even falling 
overall for the last decade. Not only did Latin America’s extractive and agricultural sectors boom due 
to China’s demand, but Chinese demand also played a role in increasing the general price level of 
major commodities during the period, significantly increasing the terms of trade across the Americas. 
As a result, LAC exports to China have become increasingly concentrated in extraction and 
agriculture. As Figure 3 shows, from 1999 to 2003, LAC exports to China were fairly balanced 
between the three major sectors, but a decade later they were dramatically different, with extraction 
accounting for over half of all LAC-China exports. They were vastly different from overall LAC 
exports, which are fairly balanced despite the growth of extractive goods. Nor do they reflect the 
overall composition of Chinese imports, which manufactured goods dominate. But this increasing 
concentration in extractive goods does reflect China’s increasing thirst for minerals, which rose from 
8% to 22% of its imports over the same time period.  
 
FIGURE 3: LAC Export Basket Composition, by Market
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Chinese investment in LAC has been similarly concentrated in primary sectors. Figures 4 shows the 
sector distribution of FDI inflows from mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and greenfield projects, 
respectively. Most Chinese direct investment into LAC has been through M&As, and over four-fifths 
of this investment has been in extraction, with 70% in oil and gas. In contrast, only 15% of overall 
M&A inflows to the region have been in that sector. Among greenfield FDI (GFDI) projects, China’s 
difference is most visible in agriculture. Food and tobacco comprise a quarter of Chinese GFDI into 
LAC, but only 4% of overall GFDI inflows. 
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FIGURE 4: Sector Distribution of FDI inflows to LAC, 2008-2012
Source: Authors’ calculations using DeaLogic (M&As), fDIMarkets (GFDI) data. Note: food, beverages, and tobacco includes 
food product production. Extraction includes oil, natural gas, mining, and basic metal processing. Percentages may not add to 
100 due to rounding.
 
2.1  Employment Creation 
Exports to China support fewer jobs than Latin America’s exports to the rest of the world. Because 
the LAC-China export basket is so different from overall LAC exports, the employment impact of 
LAC-China exports are also different. Specifically, because of the heavy concentration in extractive 
industries, LAC exports to China support fewer jobs per $1 million USD. Figure 5 shows the labor 
intensity of LAC overall economic activity, exports, and specifically LAC exports to China. Over the 
last decade, total economic activity has supported far more jobs than exports. This is largely due 
to the extremely labor-intensive nature of peasant agriculture, which is pervasive in the region but 
absent from production for export. Total exports support fewer jobs, but the labor intensity has 
remained fairly stable: falling from 59 to 56 jobs per US$1 million. Exports to China, however, have 
fallen by over a third in the number of jobs they support for every US$1 million: from nearly 70 in 
2002 to fewer than 45 in 2012.1
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FIGURE 5: Jobs Supported by Overall LAC Economic Activity and Exports
Source: Ray (2015a, forthcoming).
 
2.2  Environmental Impacts 
LAC exports to China are also more environmentally sensitive than LAC exports to the rest of the 
world. Exports to China are more carbon intensive, more water intensive, and often located in highly 
biodiverse areas inhabited by indigenous peoples. The disproportionate, and growing, concentration 
in extractive and agricultural products of LAC exports to China give them a distinctly different 
environmental footprint than other exports. This section looks more closely at two environmental 
impacts, one global (net greenhouse gas emission) and one local (water use).  
FIGURE 6: Environmental Impact of Overall LAC Economic Activity and Exports
Sources: Ray (2015b, forthcoming).
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As Figure 6 shows, LAC-China exports cause more net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and use 
more water per dollar of output than other exports, and much more than overall economic activity. 
The data in Figure 6 are from 2004, the last year of directly-measured data on each indicator. 
However, as Figures 2 shows, LAC exports to China have continued to become more and more 
concentrated in a few sectors since that time. Figure 7 applies the 2004 intensities to the changing 
trade basket composition to create a water “balance of payments” between China and LAC. It shows 
a positive balance of 100.4 billion cubic meters of water in 2012, meaning that LAC sent China much 
more water in its exports than what was embedded in imports. For reference, the volume of Lake 
Nicaragua is approximately 108 billion cubic meters. In other words, if LAC had not traded with 
China in 2012 (by producing domestically everything it imported from China, and consuming locally 
everything it exported to China), it would have saved roughly 90% of the volume of Lake Nicaragua. 
This has major ramifications not only environmentally but also socially, as the case studies in this 
project show that competition for water is a frequent source of social conflict between communities 
practicing peasant agriculture or small-scale ranching and large-scale plantations and mines.  
FIGURE 7: LAC “Balance of Payments” in Water with China
Source: Ray (2015b, forthcoming).
Figure 8 shows a similar environmental “balance of payments,” but for GHG emissions. LAC exports 
to China are responsible for far fewer GHG emissions than Chinese exports to LAC. Of course, the 
impacts of GHG emissions are global rather than local. It makes little difference to climate change 
whether those emissions originate from LAC or from China. However, the scale is still very interesting. 
As much as LAC exports to China (and their embedded GHG emission) have risen in the last decade, 
the GHG emissions embedded in LAC imports from China have risen at an even faster pace.  
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FIGURE 8: LAC “Balance of Payments” in Greenhouse Gas Emissions with China
Source: Ray (2015b, forthcoming).
 
In terms of deforestation, Figures 6 and 8 actually understate the GHG emissions from LAC’s 
relationship with China, because while they account for deforestation directly linked to exports, they 
do not account for the most important cause of deforestation: roads, canals and railroads to get 
those products to ports. Research by Philip Fearnside (the author of the Brazil case study in this 
project) and others (2013) show that access roads are the most important cause of Amazonian 
deforestation, as they open the forest to human settlements and interrupt animal migration patterns. 
Thus, in order to adequately account for the GHG impact of the “China boom” in Latin America, it is 
important to include not just exports to China but also Chinese-financed roads, canals, and railroads 
designed to get those products to ports, as well as dams to provide power to mines and oil fields. 
Figure 9 shows South America’s most biodiverse areas and indigenous territories, with Chinese-
financed infrastructure and Chinese FDI projects added. The biodiversity of these areas is reflected 
in the various shades of green: the darkest green patches (present only in eastern Ecuador and the 
northern extreme of Peru) represent areas with the highest biodiversity in four different groups of 
species: mammals, birds, amphibians, and plants. The second-darkest shade of green, present near 
the border of Peru and Brazil, indicates areas with the highest biodiversity in three of the four species 
groups, and so forth. Indigenous territories are reflected in the various tan patterns. 
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Chile, China, and Solar Panels Sometimes, the environmental impact of the LAC-China relationship can be felt more 
acutely on the import rather than export side. This is the case in Chile, where imports of Chinese photovoltaic (PV) 
panels have had a major impact on greening the Chilean energy matrix. In the mid-2000s, Chile lost its main source of 
low-emissions energy when Argentina restricted its exports of natural gas and eventually closed its pipeline to Chile 
altogether. But China was experiencing a major oversupply of PV panels at the same time. The concurrence of these 
two events gave Chile an opening to rapidly expand its use of solar power. In 2013, Chile imported US$40.9 million 
in Chinese PV panels, more than half of its total PV imports. While solar power is still a small share of total energy 
generation in the country, it is poised to expand rapidly: over half of the 10,000 megawats of new power projects with 
approved environmental are solar (Borregaard et al. 2015). 
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As Figure 9 shows, two major Chinese investments may pose serious risks to highly biodiverse 
areas and indigenous territories: the western half of the transcontinental railway and oil fields in 
eastern Ecuador. The transcontinental railway is still in its planning stage, so it does not yet have a 
finalized path. Two possibilities exist for the route of its western end: one through Piura in northern 
Peru and another through Puno in southern Peru. The northern route crosses into Brazil through an 
area with extremely high biodiversity in three out of the four species groups shown here (mammals, 
birds, amphibians, and plants), shown in dark green in Figure 9. The southern route largely avoids 
this environmentally sensitive region. The final choice of route for this railway will be crucial in 
determining its environmental impact.  
FIGURE 9: High Biodiversity Areas, Indigenous Territory, and Chinese Investment
Source: Compiled from Bass et al. (2010), Cruz Fiestas (2014), Fearnside and Figeiredo (2015), International Rivers et al., 
Ministério dos Transportes (2009), Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones, and Red Amazónica de Información 
Socioambiental Georreferencial.  
Note: Mines and some oil concessions are already in operation. Railway locations are approximate, as most plans are not 
yet final. High biodiversity is defined as the top 6.4% of South American land area for species richness. Indigenous territory 
includes lands with and without official state recognition. 
 
The other major Chinese investment in a highly biodiverse area is oil development in eastern 
Ecuador, much of which also occupies traditional indigenous territory. The southernmost two 
Chinese oil concessions in Ecuador are new and their contracts have not yet been finalized. If these 
concessions do in fact go through, the terms of their contracts will be extremely important for both 
their social and environmental impacts. 
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2.3   Rising to the Challenge: Social and Environmental Safeguard 
Innovations
In the face of this tremendous growth in sectors intrinsically linked to high environmental impacts 
and risks for social conflicts, we find that several Latin American countries have developed 
important policy responses to minimize these risks. Three of the most innovative of these responses 
are Brazil’s new environmental oversight measures, Ecuador’s new labor standards, and Peru’s 
transparency measures and indigenous protections. 
Brazil dramatically enhanced the enforcement power of its environmental regulations in 2008, 
without changing current environmental laws themselves. Instead, Brazil’s Central Bank changed 
its rules to no longer allow public bank loans to operations with unpaid fines for environmental 
irregularities reported by government agencies. Public-agency fines for environmental violations can 
be postponed through appeals, but this more proactive approach has immediate effect. 
Ecuador enacted a series of labor protections in 2008 and 2010 that form one of the most 
progressive packages of labor protection in the region for the Ecuadorean petroleum sector. In 2008, 
Ecuador strictly curtailed the use of subcontracted labor, limiting it to “complimentary” work such 
as security and custodial services. The 2010 Hydrocarbon Law further boosted labor protections in 
the oil and gas sector, by requiring foreign investors to hire Ecuadorean workers for 95% of unskilled 
and 90% of skilled jobs. Moreover, it required profit sharing with all employees, including contract 
workers. Taken together, these laws eliminated two of the most important sources of labor conflicts 
facing Chinese (and other international) investment projects across the LAC region: the use of 
foreign laborers and differences in the labor conditions between directly-hired and subcontracted 
employees working at the same project. 
Peru has made important strides in transparency and indigenous rights over the last decade. Peru 
joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007 and in 2011 became the first 
country in the Americas to be declared compliant within that framework. Also in 2011 it became the 
first LAC country to enact legislation to implement ILO Convention 169, which grants indigenous 
communities the right to prior consultation on any state policies that directly affect them, including 
concessions and permits for extractive projects within their traditional territories. To comply with 
its EITI commitments, the Peruvian government and participating companies publish detailed 
reports of revenue flows related to the extractive industries, available online for concerned citizens 
and civil society. Furthermore, the Peruvian government assigned staff from the Ministry of Energy 
and Mining to the EITI process, including working with non-participating companies to encourage 
participation. Starting in 2014, three Chinese companies confirmed their involvement in the process: 
Shougang, China MinMetals and CNPC. These two measures put Peru in a leadership position 
regionally for public participation in the resource boom. 
2.4  Progress Under Fire: Challenges to Existing Protections 
The LAC-China export boom has been supported by high world prices for the commodities involved, 
which has boosted the value of minerals reserves and increased bargaining power for countries 
interested in enacting social and environmental standards for their use. However, the same 
phenomenon has boosted the power of sectors associated with the boom, which have incentives to 
resist these standards. 
Within governments, the extractive boom has prioritized mining and hydrocarbons ministries, as 
executive branches face pressure to speed up the process of beginning new investment projects. To 
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that end, Peru has recently curtailed the authority of the Environment Ministry over the approval 
and supervision of extractive projects. The objective is to streamline the process of getting new 
extractive investments under way and accelerate production in the face of flagging world prices, 
but this change has not incorporated safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest from corrupting the 
process and diminishing the power of environmental oversight (Saravia López and Rua Quiroga, 
2015; Sanborn and Chonn, 2015). 
In Brazil, the China boom has also had major impact on the agricultural sector. There, Chinese 
demand has enriched and empowered the “ruralist” voting block, representing large landholders 
in Congress. This newly strengthened voting block has exerted powerful influence on the current 
administration’s environmental stances (Santilli, 2014; Smeraldi, 2014). For example, it has 
mounted an effort to roll back the new Central Bank rules cited above, which have proven useful in 
strengthening enforcement of environmental safeguards. 
 
Section 3: THE PERFORMANCE OF CHINESE 
INVESTORS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Our research shows that Chinese firms do not perform significantly worse relative to domestic or 
other international firms. In fact, despite relatively weaker levels of regulation at home in China, and a 
fledgling set of guidelines for overseas companies, our case studies found some instances of Chinese 
firms outperforming their competitors, especially with proper incentives from governments and 
civil society. Table 1 lists the Chinese firms associated with each case study and the members of the 
Working Group that performed the case studies (with the exception of Brazil and Chile, where the case 
studies involved Brazilian firms exporting to China and Chilean imports from China, respectively). This 
section explores lessons from each of these case studies. Overall, they show that Chinese firms are 
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Country Authors Sector Firms
Argentina Andrés López, Julian Donaubauer, Daniela Ramos, 
Center for Transformation Research,  
University of Buenos Aires
Petroleum China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) and China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec)
Bolivia Alejandra Saravia López, Universidad Mayor de San 
Simon-Cochabamba, Adam Rua Quiroga 
Mining Jungie Mining
Brazil Philip Fearnside, Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da 
Amazônia; Adriano M.R. Figueiredo, Universidade 
Federal de Mato Grosso do Sul 
Agriculture  
and mining
Soy and Iron exports
Chile Nicola Borregaard y Annie Dufey, Fundación Chile Energy (solar) Solar panels imports 
Colombia Guillermo Rudas and Mauricio Cabrera Leal, 
Javeriana and Externado Universities of Colombia
Coal and 
petroleum
Sinopec and Sinochem
Ecuador Rebecca Ray, Boston University; Adam Chimienti,  
Institute of China Asia Pacific Studies, National Sun 
Yat-sen University in Taiwan
Petroleum Sinopec and China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC)
Mexico Claudia Schatan, Diana Piloyan,  
Universidad Iberoamericana
Manufacturing Golden Dragon Affiliates
Peru Cynthia Sanborn and Victoria Chonn Ching, 
Universidad del Pacífico
Mining Shougang, Aluminum Corporation of 
China (Chinalco), and Zijin Mining Group
TABLE 1: Chinese Investors Profiled in Case Studies
flexible, able to adapt to new environments and perform up to local standards. However, several of the 
cases show that as these investments continue to expand, major challenges still lie ahead. 
Among these Chinese firms is one that our case studies examine in three different Latin American 
countries: Sinopec. The case studies show that Sinopec has had very different experiences under 
different regulatory regimes and with different incentives. Sinopec’s labor relations in Argentina and 
environmental performance in Ecuador have been more positive than either in Colombia. 
•				Sinopec’s	labor	challenges	in	Colombia have involved the local community action boards, which 
are common in rural Colombia and control the hiring of oil workers. Allegations abound of 
powerful local figures trading employment for favors or even fees, or unfairly favoring workers 
from other areas over local workers, but the regional Labor Ministry officials state that these 
complaints have not been formalized for fear of endangering the very employment positions 
they involve. The Colombian national government is considering removing hiring authority from 
community action boards, but the proposal faces vigorous opposition by the boards themselves, 
unsurprisingly. In contrast, Sinopec faces no such issues in Argentina or Ecuador, because of the 
regulatory framework in each country. In Argentina, Sinopec has signed an agreement with the 
local government ensuring that all workers will have had residency in the Santa Cruz province 
for at least two years prior to their hiring. In Ecuador, subcontracted labor is tightly regulated, as 
discussed above. 
•				Environmentally,	Sinopec	has	a	better	record	in	Ecuador	than	most	of	its	competitors,	with	fewer	
local protests over spills than most of its competitors, either foreign or domestic. This record is 
partly due to the incentives it faces there: it bought oil concessions that were initially owned by 
Chevron and therefore receive a great deal of attention. Sinopec’s ability to maintain a low profile 
has been key to its ability to continue operations for nearly a decade. In contrast, the Comptroller 
General of Colombia cited Sinopec in 2014 for never paying the US$500,000 investment in 
conservation required by law and pledged in 2008. These two cases show the importance of 
establishing — and enforcing — an effective regulatory framework for international investment. 
Fortunately, Colombia appears to be taking this to heart, as its 2014 environmental finding and 
the recent proposed change in labor regulation show. 
Other positive outcomes in the case studies show that Chinese investors are capable of living up 
to high standards, especially when the proper incentives are in place. These case studies show 
the importance of cooperation between governments, investors, local communities, and Chinese 
regulators in creating those incentives. Areas where this cooperation can be especially helpful 
include oversight by lenders, community engagement at the outset of projects, and training investors 
in compliance with local laws. 
 
3.1  Incentives from Home: the role of lender oversight 
China should be credited for enacting guidelines for its overseas economic activities. When 
Western countries were at middle-income status such guidelines were not on government radar 
screens. Other middle-income countries (like Brazil, discussed above) prevent public lending to 
domestic projects with outstanding environmental fines, and multilateral lenders have long required 
borrowers to meet environmental performance standards. But these kinds of standards for outbound 
international investment sets China ahead of its middle-income country peers. Nonetheless, China is 
a relative newcomer to international investment, and its environmental and social safeguards still lag 
behind those of the traditional multilateral lenders. 
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There are three levels of safeguards for Chinese outbound investment. First, the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) has published voluntary “Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign 
Investment and Cooperation” for all investors, regardless of whether they are public or private, or 
how they are financed. While these are not binding, they carry moral authority for state-owned 
enterprises (Tao 2013). For projects that are bank-financed, China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) has set “Green Credit Guidelines” for all Chinese banks that finance investment projects 
abroad, which include requiring investments to meet host country and international environmental 
laws. Finally, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Ex-
Im Bank), state-owned “policy banks” that fund overseas investments in the name of the Chinese 
government, have developed safeguard practices for projects within their portfolios. 
Table 2 compares Chinese guidelines to those of major multilateral lenders: the World Bank, the 
International Finance Corporation, and the Inter-American Development Bank. While the Chinese 
lenders and regulators have fewer requirements than the multilateral lenders, there is one notable 
exception: only the Chinese policy banks require ex-post environmental impact assessments.  
TABLE 2: Chinese and Multilateral Regulations Compared
 
Note: *MOFCOM policies are voluntary in nature.  
Source: CBRC 2012; Gallagher et al. 2012; Leung and Zhao 2013; State Forestry Administration 2010.
 
The regulations shown in Table 2 demonstrate a major step forward for Chinese lenders, but 
those lenders still face steep challenges in enforcement. For example, without a grievance policy, 
lenders may not know about violations of other requirements like compliance with international 
environmental laws. Furthermore, even requiring compliance with host country law — arguably the 
least challenging of the requirements in Table 2 to enforce — can be challenging if local governments 
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Multilateral lenders Chinese banks and regulators
World Bank IFC IDB MOFCOM* CBRC CDB Ex-Im Bank
Ex-ante environmental impact 
assessments
X X X X X X
Project review of environmental 
impact assessments
X X X X X
Industry-specific social and 
environmental standards
X X
Require compliance with host 
country environmental regulations
X X X X X X
Require compliance with int’l 
environmental regulations
X X
Public consultations with affected 
communities
X X X X X
Grievance mechanism X X
Independent monitoring and review X
Establishing covenants linked to 
compliance
X X X X
Ex-post environmental impact 
assessments
X X
are not enforcing their own laws. For example, in the Sinopec case in Colombia discussed above, the 
Comptroller General cited not only Sinopec but also the national environmental licensing agency, 
for not enforcing its own regulations sufficiently. In a situation like that one, it is not clear that 
MOFCOM has the grounds to claim that Sinopec is in violation of their guidelines. Latin American 
civil society groups have begun educating communities about the Green Credit Directives and other 
environmental and social safeguards attached to Chinese lending, but without a formal method for 
receiving and investigating complaints, banks have little immediate incentive to follow up on any 
communication they receive. Given the difficulty in policing investor behavior abroad, it could be 
extremely helpful for Chinese lenders to approach Latin American civil society and governments as 
partners in holding investors accountable to these guidelines, perhaps through introducing a formal 
grievance mechanism. 
 
3.2  The Importance of Community Engagement 
Our case studies show that an investor’s willingness and ability to work with governments and 
local communities from the outset is paramount for successful project completion. Three examples 
highlight this lesson particularly well: the Toromocho copper mine owned by Chinalco in Peru, the 
Jungie tin mine in Bolivia, and Andes Petroleum in Ecuador. Each case illustrates the importance of 
government incentives and assistance in the negotiation process. 
In Bolivia, China’s Jungie Mining and the local Alto Canutillos mining cooperative formed a joint 
venture to mine tin in Tacobamba in 2010. While the mine does not appear in the extremely 
biodiverse areas shown in Figure 9, it does lie within threatened land: the Tropical Andes Biodiversity 
Hotspot.2 Figure 10 shows the Bolivian segment of the Tropical Andes Biodiversity Hotspot in green, 
and indigenous territory in orange.  
FIGURE 10: Bolivia: Biodiversity Hotspot, Indigenous Territory, and Chinese Mines
Source: Compiled from Red Amazónica de Información Socioambiental Georreferencial and Zador et al. 2015. 
Note: Indigenous territory includes lands with and without official state recognition. 
Before operations could begin, surveys showed that the local community was opposed to the 
establishment of a processing plant and tailings dam in Tacobamba. In response, the state-owned 
COMIBOL mining company donated land over 25 miles away for the facility, in Agua Dulce, Villa de 
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Yocalla, where a public consultation showed that the community accepted its presence. This move 
took cooperation between the investors, the government, and the local community, and prevented a 
major potential source of conflict (Saravia López and Rua Quiroga 2015). 
IMAGE 1: Tacobamba, Bolivia residents rejected the presence of a processing plant 
… so COMIBOL donated land for the plant, over 25 miles away from the mine.
Source: Saravia López and Rua Quiroga (2015).
In Peru, Chinese SOE Chinalco’s Toromocho mine also borders the Tropical Andes Biodiversity 
Hotspot, as Figure 11 shows.3  
FIGURE 11: Peru: Biodiversity Hotspots, Indigenous Territory, and Chinese Mines
Source: Compiled from Red Amazónica de Información Socioambiental Georreferencial and Zador et al. 2015.
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In 2007, Chinalco inherited a commitment to relocate the 5,000 residents of the existing city of 
Morococha to make way for the mine construction. Morococha is a former mining camp and its 
water and soil has been badly contaminated from decades of nearby mining operations. Prior to 
Chinalco’s purchase of this project, the Peruvian government was expected to build a new town 
for the residents, but Chinalco took on the obligation as part of the investment. While the old 
Morococha had communal latrines and a limited water supply, “Nueva Morococha” promises a 
modern water and sanitation system. Perhaps most importantly, the move was largely voluntary and 
the product of dialogue and negotiation between community members, their elected authorities, 
the central government and the investor — considered the first example of voluntary, participatory 
community relocation in modern Peruvian history. While it has not been without problems (for 
example, Chinalco offered each moving family a title to their new homes, but the municipality has 
been delayed in issuing them) and their continue to be a number of holdouts, it represents a step 
forward in Peruvian mining community relations (Sanborn and Chonn 2015).  
IMAGE 2: Morococha (left) and Nueva Morococha (right), Peru
 
Source: Ojos Propios, 2013 (left); Ministerio de Energía y Minas, 2013 (right).
The community consultation process has not gone so smoothly in Ecuador, where Andes Petroleum 
(a joint venture between Chinese SOEs Sinopec and CNPC) won two new concessions in early 2014. 
As shown Figure 9, Ecuador is the only South American country where major Chinese investments 
exist in an area with extremely high biodiversity in four different species groups as well as traditional 
indigenous territory (the map below shows this situation in more detail). So its respect for social 
and environmental safeguards are especially important, perhaps more so than any other Chinese 
investments in this project. Until now, Andes has had better community relations than most of its 
competitors (including Ecuadorean SOEs), with fewer protests due to contamination or unfulfilled 
social obligations. But its real challenge lies ahead, as its current expansion is beginning under 
acrimonious conditions, without the proper community consultation. 
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FIGURE 12: Chinese Oil Concessions, Biodiversity, and Indigenous Territory, Ecuador
 
Source: Ray and Chimienti 2015.
 
Ecuadorean law requires the Secretary of Hydrocarbons (SHE) to seek majority approval within the 
affected community, and in particular among the Sápara and Kichwa indigenous nations, whose 
authority over developments in their traditional territory Ecuador enshrined when it signed onto ILO 
Convention 169. However, SHE circumvented these obligations by getting the approval of the Sápara 
president instead of seeking the majority approval of the Sápara and Kichwa communities. SHE also 
opened temporary outreach offices in the affected area, and claims that 16,469 people participated 
in workshops or submitted comments — a number equal to about one-fourth of the local adult 
indigenous population, or about one-eight of the total adult population in the new concession blocks. 
Sápara and Kichwa community leaders have responded by mounting an international struggle to 
reclaim authority over their traditional lands and reject all oil development there. The possibilities for 
Andes Petroleum to establish a positive relationship with the local community are extremely slim at 
this point, because good-faith negotiations involving the government and the local community are 
almost impossible. (Ray and Chimienti 2015). 
3.3   Government-Firm Relations: the Importance of Outreach and Learning 
Another important venue for cooperation between investors, governments, and civil society is in 
training new arrivals on local environmental and social regulations, customs, and available local 
resources. Recent examples in Peru, Argentina, and Mexico show that this is a promising area that 
Latin American governments are just beginning to bring to explore. 
In March 2014, Chinalco’s Toromocho mine project in Peru (noted above for its community 
relocation process) suffered a major setback when the Organism for Environmental Evaluation and 
Fiscalization (OEFA), within the Ministry of the Environment, ordered it to halt operations following a 
leak of acid wastewater. The problem was generated by unexpectedly heavy rainfall, which Chinalco 
had apparently not taken into account. After the cleanup, which happened in a period of a few days 
after rapid action by regulators and Chinalco, the Association of Chinese Companies in Peru asked 
the Environment Ministry to organize a series of conferences for all of their members about Peru’s 
environmental regulations. This was an opportunity for the government to address environmental 
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concerns in a proactive way as well as to form working 
relationships with environmental safety personnel at the investing 
firms, and to lay the groundwork for future cooperation. 
Argentina is a unique case: negotiations over oil royalties and 
environmental and social commitments happen at the provincial 
level. This arrangement has important drawbacks, in that it 
creates an incentive for provincial government negotiators 
to treat short-term royalties and long-term environmental 
commitments as tradeoffs. But it also creates an opportunity 
for local civil society groups, which have much more access to 
the negotiators than they would if negotiations happened at 
the national level. This has allowed for small business groups 
to successfully press for foreign oil companies to develop more 
linkages with local suppliers. For example, Pan American Energy 
(CNOOC’s joint entity with BP) has developed the “SMEs of Golfo 
San Jorge” program to build capacity for local small businesses 
and incorporate them into PAE’s supply chain. This kind of 
cooperation requires the presence of the provincial government 
officials to help recently arrived foreign investors connect with 
local organizations. Another important opportunity for training 
and capacity building in Argentina involves facilitating learning 
between more experienced and more recent investors: in this 
case, CNOOC and Sinopec. Our case study shows that CNOOC 
has a better environmental record than Sinopec, partly because CNOOC partners with BP, which 
has a long history of pursuing foreign investment and receiving global scrutiny for its environmental 
record. Even though both CNOOC and Sinopec are Chinese SOEs, one benefits from its cooperation 
with more experienced investors while the other does not. Argentina can help bridge these 
differences by facilitating training for foreign investors, where new arrivals can learn from their more 
experienced peers. 
The Mexico case study is another situation where training may be very useful. Generally speaking, 
the Golden Dragon copper tube manufacturing company has abided by environmental and labor 
law, and has even introduced important new energy efficiency innovations. Nonetheless, it has run 
into labor difficulty due to cultural barriers. One major obstacle springs from the fact that the firm’s 
Chinese employees do not speak Spanish, the Mexican employees do not speak Chinese, and very 
few members of either group of employees speak a common third language such as English. Another 
important stumbling block has come from Chinese managers’ unfamiliarity with Mexican customs. 
Chinese minimum wages are quite low, and workers compensate by working extremely long hours. 
In contrast, Mexican workers tend to be less willing to work on weekends and holidays. Golden 
Dragon has a history of requiring workers to work on those days, and not compensating them 
appropriately for their overtime, largely because they are not accustomed to workers expecting that 
time off. These cultural differences between Golden Dragon’s Chinese and Mexican workers are 
unlikely to be resolved without being specifically addressed, because the two groups of workers do 
not speak the same languages or socialize together. But they are the types of misunderstandings 
that can be addressed rather straightforwardly with training to ensure that Mexican labor laws 
protect workers and Chinese investors need to respect Mexican labor laws. 
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IMAGE 3: Kichwa and Sápara Leaders Protest 
Andes Petroleum in New York City, 2014 
 
Left: Leonardo Cerda, Kichwa leader; Center: Gloria 
Ushigua, President of the Association of Sápara Women; 
People’s Climate March, New York, 21 September 2014. 
Source: Amazon Watch.
 Section 4: LESSONS FOR POLICY 
 Our study has shown that the China-led commodity boom in Latin America has accentuated 
environmental and social conflict in the region. Although Latin American governments, Chinese 
firms, and civil society can be credited for some innovations during the China boom, by and large 
the benefits of China-led trade and investment have come with significant environmental and social 
costs. These costs can be reduced by concerted action by Latin American governments, the Chinese 
government and Chinese firms, and by civil society in Latin America, China, and across the world. 
 4.1  Latin American Governments 
 For Latin America to truly benefit from this commodity-led growth, Latin American governments 
will need to capture and invest more of the windfall into social and environmental protections. 
Civil society organizations in the region will need to hold governments more accountable. Our 
case studies found numerous examples of Latin American governments developing innovative 
policy responses to the China boom. Ecuador’s labor laws, Bolivia’s implementation of community 
consultation, and Peru’s leadership on transparency stand out as particularly important policy 
steps. There is tremendous room for Latin American civil society groups to take advantage of these 
examples to push for higher standards everywhere. 
 Chinese oil companies have shown in Ecuador that they are capable of operating with almost 
entirely Ecuadorean staff. Bolivia has shown that it is possible for Chinese mining companies and 
local SOEs to collaborate to honor communities’ decisions about where processing plants should — 
and should not — be located. Peru has shown that Chinese mining and oil companies are capable 
of reaching high levels of transparency. Latin American civil society and governments can push for 
these standards to be adopted in countries that do not yet have them, knowing that these standards 
are not only reasonable, but that Chinese investors are perfectly capable of reaching them. 
 This progress is being threatened, however, by the very sectors enriched by the China boom, such 
as mining ministries and large landowner voting blocs. For example, regulatory reforms in Peru 
are cutting back the Environment Ministry’s oversight of extractive projects, without putting in 
place safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest in the approval process. In Brazil, the progress in 
environmental law enforcement faces strong resistance from the “ruralist” landowner voting bloc 
that has benefited so much from China’s demand for soy. Proposed labor law protections for oil 
workers in Colombia may not go through because of pressure from the community action boards 
that have been the target of so many abuse complaints. It is crucial for Latin American governments 
to hold the line against these deregulation efforts. It is paramount that LAC governments strike a 
better  balance between short-term economic benefits and longer run economic and ecological 
costs — even if that leads to the rejection of certain projects in the immediate future. 
Specifically, we recommend that Latin American governments prioritize:
•	 Enforcement	and	upgrading	of	existing	environmental	and	social	protections.	
•	 	Defend	and	strengthen	the	capacity	of	environmental	and	social	ministries	to	enforce	and	upgrade	
laws, such as with the Ombudsman program in Peru.
•	 	Joining	the	Extractive	Industries	Transparency	Initiative,	and	encouraging	Chinese	firms	to	participate.
•	 	Implementing	ILO	Convention	169	(which	most	Latin	American	governments	have	signed),	by	
enacting and enforcing requirements for prior consultation of indigenous peoples regarding state 
policy measures that affect their interests and welfare. 
•	 	Requiring	foreign	investors	to	hire	local	workers	wherever	possible,	perhaps	through	quotas	or	
floors, and limiting the use of subcontracted labor.
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•	 	Spearheading	collaboration	between	Latin	American	governments,	local	civil	society	and	foreign	
investors to seek informed consultation before extractive projects begin, and to address local 
concerns in good faith.
•	 	Investing	in	capacity	building	for	local	businesses	and	encouraging	foreign	investors	to	incorporate	
them into their supply chains.
•	 	Developing	mechanisms	for	Latin	American	governments,	the	Chinese	government	and	local	civil	
society to collaborate in holding Chinese investors to the standards in China’s guidelines and local 
regulations.
•	 	Creating	opportunities	for	new	foreign	investors	to	learn	local	regulations	and	customs	from	
governments, civil society, and investors that have been present for longer.
•	 	Defending	and	strengthening	the	capacity	of	civil	society	organizations	for	capacity	building,	
networking, and other opportunities to serve as actors that can monitor the social and 
environmental behavior of firms and governments alike. 
 4.2  China and Chinese Investors 
 Safeguarding the social and environmental impacts of Chinese investment overseas helps Chinese 
firms and the government better identify risk and expand market share. Driving the Latin America-
China boom are billions of dollars in Chinese investment into mines, oil and gas fields, dams to 
power them, and railways to get the products to port. These massive projects will take years to come 
into operation and even more years to pay for themselves. In order to reach that point, Chinese 
investors will need to mitigate risks to these projects’ longevity, especially risks of environmental 
damage or social conflict that could jeopardize their relationships with host countries. 
 Our case studies show that Chinese firms are capable of meeting — and beating — the 
environmental and social standards set by their host countries. In fact, we have found some 
instances of Chinese investors outperforming their local and international competitors, especially 
when given the right incentives and regulatory framework. China has taken important steps toward 
making sure all Chinese investors have incentives to act with corporate social and environmental 
responsibility, through the CBRC’s Green Credit Guidelines and MOFCOM’s Guidelines for 
Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation. Furthermore, making these 
processes more transparent is also paramount to success, to allow Chinese companies, Latin 
American governments, and civil society to have a better understanding of the true benefits and 
risks of various investments. However, overseeing investor behavior abroad is extremely difficult 
without the collaboration of host country governments and civil society. For that reason, we 
specifically recommend that China and Chinese investors prioritize:
•	 	Implementing	existing	social	and	environmental	guidelines	and	making	their	use	more	widespread	
as Chinese firms and development banks increase their presence in the Americas.
•	 	Working	to	make	the	results	of	social	and	environmental	guidelines	more	transparent	for	company	
representatives, governments, and civil society.
•	 	Upgrading	current	guidelines	with	independent	monitoring,	a	formal	grievance	process,	enforcement	
mechanisms for investors who fall short of the standards, and other safeguards that have become 
commonplace among other major foreign investors across the globe. 
•	 	Participating	in	transparency	programs	in	their	host	countries,	such	as	the	environmental	reporting	
requirements in Colombia or the voluntary EITI program in Peru.
•	 	Establishing	working	relationships	with	Latin	American	governments	and	civil	society	groups	to	
learn the local regulations and customs. 
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 4.3  Civil Society 
 Policy improvements like these — on both the Latin American and Chinese side of the Pacific — will 
only be enhanced by participation from all walks of civil society: 
•	 	Direct	NGO	actions	that	highlight	both	the	successes	and	limitations	of	government	and	company	
policies can bring issues to the attention of policy-makers and the media. NGOs should expand their 
networks to monitor new economic actors in their region and link with their counterparts in China 
and across the world to bring further attention to these issues.
•	 	Academic	research	and	workshops	can	help	derive	a	more	empirical-based	understanding	of	these	
complex issues and serve as a neutral space where governments, companies, and civil society can 
dialogue. Academics can also form international networks to compare findings with other analyses 
and disseminate their work more widely.
•	 	Academic	researchers	and	universities	can	also	play	a	role	in	promoting	educational	and	cultural	
exchange, joint research, and training for governments and other members of civil society.
•	 	NGOs,	academia,	and	other	organizations	can	collaborate	with	governments	and	companies	to	learn	
best practices and lessons from past mistakes.
•	 	Business-to-business	collaboration	such	as	the	association	of	Chinese	enterprises	in	Peru	can	meet	
to learn of best practices, pending regulation, and learn from mistakes.
•	 	Finally	the	media	can	move	beyond	general	discussions	of	the	China-Latin	America	economic	
relationship and conduct more empirical reporting efforts that hold governments and firms 
accountable. 
  The studies in this project underscore the importance — and the promise — of collaboration 
between governments, Chinese investors, and Latin American civil society. The most successful 
stories uncovered here are of these groups working together: Bolivia’s successful community 
consultation process, Chinese companies in Peru joining the EITI program, and CNOOC’s 
development of a local small-business suppliers in Argentina. China needs Latin American 
governments and civil society as their eyes and ears for the implementation of their guidelines for 
overseas investors. Chinese investors need Latin American governments and civil society to train 
them on local regulations and customs, to prevent environmental and social conflicts from erupting 
in the first place. Latin American governments need Chinese investors and community groups to 
come together to find solutions that work for everyone involved. It is imperative for all stakeholder 
groups to establish working relationships with each other, in order for the China-Latin America 
relationship to have the greatest benefit and the least risk.
ENDNOTES
1  It is worth noting that Figure 5 includes only direct rather than indirect employment. Direct labor intensity across the region 
has an average of 60.1 jobs in agriculture, 11.6 jobs in extraction, and 71.8 jobs in manufacturing for every US$ 1 million output 
in each sector. Estimates of indirect employment vary dramatically, even within each sector. According to the World Input-
Output Database (Timmer 2012), for every dollar of output, extraction creates about twice as much demand for upstream 
(indirect) industries as agriculture in Brazil, only about a third as much in Mexico, and about three-fourths as much in non-
OECD countries. Based on these estimates, it is highly unlikely for the total (direct and indirect) employment from extraction 
to rival the other sectors shown here for employment generation.
2  Biodiversity hotspots are defined as areas with at least 1,500 endemic plant species, which have lost at least 70 percent 
of their original habitat. For more on biodiversity hotspots, and on the Tropical Andes hotspot specifically, see Zador et al. 
(2015).
3  For more on biodiversity hotspots, and on the Tropical Andes hotspot specifically, see Zador et al. (2015).
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